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Longworth v. Ozmint
377 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2004)
L Facts
On the night ofJanuary 7,1991, Richard Longworth and David Rocheville
robbed the Westgate Mall Cinema. In the course of the robbery, the men
encountered theater usher Alex Hopps. Longworth knocked Hopps to the floor
and dragged him outside the theater where Rocheville shot him in the left side
of the head. The men reentered the theater and directed theater employeeJames
Greene to open the safe in the ticket booth. They took money bags from the
safe, retrieved more bags from Greene's car, and forced Greene into their
minivan. Longworth instructed Rocheville to shoot Greene if he moved. A
short distance from the theater, Longworth stopped the van, ordered Greene out
of the vehicle, and instructed him to walk five paces, get on his knees, and stare
straight ahead. Rocheville then shot Greene in the back of the head.'
Longworth and Rocheville were each indicted on one count of kidnapping,
one count of robbery, and two counts of murder.2 After Longworth's arrest, his
parents retained attorney Hubert Powell to represent him in the capital murder
trial.3 The parents paid $12,000 in attorney's fees.4 When Powell requested
additional resources, the trial court appointed private attorney AndrewJohnston
and the county Public Defender's Office as additional counsel. Three days later,
the trial court amended the order to "clarify" that Powell was actually the
attorney for Longworth's parents.6 The apparent reason for the change was to
make Longworth eligible for state funds to aid his defense.' The amendment was
made without the request or knowledge of Powell, Longworth, or his parents.8
Powell learned of the change shortly before trial but nevertheless continued as
a member of the defense team.9
1. Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id at 441.
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id at 441-42.
7. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 442.
8. Id.
9. Id Powell testified that he acted as a liaison with Longworth's family and helped to
investigate mitigation evidence. Id
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At trial, Deputy Sheriff James Murray testified for the State concerning
Longworth's postarrest interrogation." Following the interrogation, Murray
prepared a statement from his notes and asked Longworth to sign it."
Longworth refused to sign, preferring to wait for the advice of his attorney. 1-
Nonetheless, Murray read the statement at trial as an accurate account of
Longworth's statements.'3 When the prosecutor asked Murray if he had anything
to add that was not included in the statement, Murray replied that Longworth
"mentioned... that... he observed Rocheville raising the gun up to Alex's head,
and he did nothing to stop him. He just watched him." 4 The prosecutor pushed
further, asking, "[d]id [Longworth] say he knew what was happening?"'" Murray
responded that Longworth "said he knew what wasgoing to happen... [b]ut he did
nothing to stop him."' 6
Longworth's counsel objected because the defense had not been informed
of any such statement. 7 The court questioned Murray outside the jury's
presence. 8 Murray stated that his trial testimony was not a quote but a
paraphrase of Longworth's interrogation statement. 9 The court concluded that
Murray's trial testimony was his own interpretation, not reflected in his
interrogation notes, and accordingly, gave a curative instruction to the jury.2'
Also at trial, Murray testified that during the postarrest interrogation,
"Longworth slammed his fist on the table ... and exclaimed, '[M]y god, we killed
10. Id. at 444-45.
11. Id at 445.
12. Id.
13. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 445.
14. Id.




19. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 445.
20. Id. The judge gave the following instruction:
You had heard testimony from the statement by Chief Murray that the defendant says
I saw Rocheville with the gun, and I did nothing to stop it. That's part of the state-
ment. The solicitor went on to say did Longworrh say I knew what, he knew what was
oingto happen. And Chief Murray says yes, he says he knew what was going to
h appen. And that's not true. And that's not in the statement.
And I have conferred with Chief Murray here in this courtroom on the record. And
that is his interpretation. That is not a statement by the defendant. I must ask you to
disregard that, to wipe that comment from your mind. It is [an] improper thing to be
injected into this trial, and you disregard it entirely please. It is so important.
The only statement made was I saw Rocheville, and I did nothing to stop him. And
that's the end of it as best as I can tell. Disregard anything further from Chief Murray
on that point as I have outlined to you.
Id. at 445-46 (alteration in original).
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those kids for fifteen hundred dollars.' ,2? On cross-examination, Murray stated
that he did not know whether the statement by Longworth indicated remorse.'
At a later postconviction relief ("PCR") proceeding, however, Murray testified
that he thought Longworth expressed remorse but that Longworth could just
have been upset that he got caught.
23
Separate juries convicted and sentenced both men to death.24 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina affirmed Longworth's conviction and sentence, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 25 Longworth then filed an
application for postconviction relief raising more than thirty grounds for relief.26
The state PCR court permitted discovery and held an evidentiary hearing.
27
At the hearing, "Longworth's mother testified that she told Powell about
alcohol abuse and domestic violence" in the Longworth family but indicated that
she did not want the evidence presented at sentencing "unless it was absolutely
necessary. ' At trial, defense counsel presented mitigation evidence that detailed
Longworth's own history but not his family background.29
Represented by new counsel, Longworth contended in the PCR proceedings
that this reflected a conflict of interest on the part of Powell.' However, the
hearing revealed that Johnston, not Powell, made the decision to de-emphasize
the defendant's family history.3 Johnston testified that he made a strategic
decision to focus the mitigation defense on Longworth's own history of
substance abuse, his intoxication at the time of the murders, his minor role in the
murders, and Rocheville's influence over Longworth.32
The PCR court concluded that Longworth's parents hired Powell to
represent Longworth's interests and not their own.33 The court noted that
Powell met with Longworth at least forty-four times and considered Longworth
21. Id. at 447 (alteration in original).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id at 440.
25. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 440-41; see State v. Longworth, 438 S.E.2d 219, 220 (S.C. 1993)
(affirming Longworth's conviction and sentence); Longworth v. South Carolina, 513 U.S. 831, 831
(1994) (denying certiorari).
26. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 441.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 442. Longworth's mother feared that her foster children would be taken away from
her. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 441.
31. Id. at 442.
32. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 442.
33. Id.
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his "true client."'  The court determined that Powell's "interests were solely
directed to saving [Longworth's] life." 35 Finally, the PCR court found that Powell
did not prevent the defense's social worker from receiving pertinent information
about Longworth's family history.36
Also during the PCR hearing, the prosecutor testified that in a meeting with
Murray about a week before trial, Murray "told him that Longworth said
'something like' he knew or intended that the killings would take place."37
According to the prosecutor, he told Murray that the statement, which was not
recorded in Murray's notes, was not sufficiently reliable and that he would not
use it at trial." The court concluded that Murray's trial statement was not false
but rather an "honest, but vague, recollection that Longworth indicated to him
during the interrogation that he knew what was going to happen, but was unable
to recall the precise words used."39 The PCR court further determined that the
judge's curative instruction negated any prejudice that might have resulted from
Murray's statement.4
After the evidentiary hearing, both parties submitted supplemental briefs.
41
The PCR court eventually directed the State to submit a proposed order.4 2 The
court denied Longworth's claims and substantially adopted the State's proposed
order.43 In 2002 the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied Longworth's
petition for review.' The United States Supreme Court also denied Longworth's
certiorari petition.4' Longworth then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
34. Id at 443.
35. Id.
36. Id Dr. Raskin, a forensic psychiatrist who examined Longworth prior to trial, testified
in a later deposition that his evaluation did not include information about the domestic abuse and
that he had assumed Longworth had grown up in a stable environment. Id at 442. He explained
that information about abuse and violence would have influenced his interview strategy with
Longworth. Id Accordingly he would have presented new information about Longworth's family
history to the jury. Id.
37. Id at 446.
38. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 446.
39. Id
40. Id
41. Id at 441.
42. Id
43. Id The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in a footnote that,
"[a]lthough we have indicated that we 'do not applaud' a state court's practice of substantially
adopting the prosecution's proposed memorandum and order, the state court's decision still merits
the deferential review required by § 2254(d)." Id at 443 n.1; see 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating
that a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner only if the state court
decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law"; part of AEDPA).
44. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 441.
45. Id; see Longworth v. South Carolina, 536 U.S. 928, 928 (2002) (denying certiorari).
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raising nineteen claims for relief.46 The United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and
denied fifteen of the nineteen claims. 47 The court then denied three of the four
remaining claims on their merits and held that the fourth, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel ("IAC'), was procedurally defaulted.' The district court
granted a certificate of appealability with respect to all four claims.
49
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the
district court's decision de novo and held that, although Longworth's retained
counsel also represented Longworth's parents, he did not have an actual conflict
of interest.' The court also found that even if retained counsel had a conflict of
interest, Longworth failed to show that anything counsel did on Longworth's
behalf compromised his interest or representation."' Thus, the PCR court's
determination that any conflict did not adversely affect Longworth's
representation was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Fourth
Circuit next determined that the State PCR court acted reasonably when it
concluded that Murray's statement that Longworth knew what was going to
happen was not actually false and that the curative instruction was sufficient. 53
The court also concluded that Murray's mental impression, that Longworth
expressed remorse during the postarrest interview, was not exculpatory evidence
that had to be disclosed to the defendant pursuant to Brady v. Magyland.4 Finally,
46. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 441.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id; see Longworth v. Ozmint, 302 F. Supp. 2d 569,574-75 (D.S.C. 2004) (denying in part
and granting in part a certificate of appealability with respect to Longworth's claims); 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1) (2000) (providing that "[unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appeal-
ability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals"; part of AEDPA); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
(stating that for a certificate of appealability to issue, the applicant must make a "substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right"; part of AEDPA).
50. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 444; see Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284,289 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that
the review of district court decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is de novo); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2000) (stating the proper standard for granting a writ of habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).
51. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 444.
52. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to a state
court decision shall not be granted unless the state court decision was "based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding"; part of
AEDPA).
53. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 446-47.
54. Id. at 447; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding "that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").
2004]
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the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that Longworth's
LAC claims were procedurally barred.s 5
III. Analysis
A. Conflict of Interest Claim
The court cited Cuylerv. Sullivan8 6 for the proposition that "[a] defendant can
prove a Sixth Amendment violation based on counsel's conflict of interest by
'demonstratfing] that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance.' ""' Although the pretrial order entered by the state trial court
indicated that Powell "had the position of attorney for the parents of the
Defendant," the Fourth Circuit relied on the PCR court's findings and rejected
Longworth's conflict of interest claim.58 In support of its conclusion, the Fourth
Circuit pointed to several lower court findings.59 First, the record showed that
an attorney in the Public Defender's Office independently sought the revision in
the record to make Longworth eligible for public funds.' Second, Powell,
Longworth, and Longworth's parents were unaware of the amended order.6'
Next, Powell thought of himself as a member of the defense team and as a
representative of Longworth's interests.6 2 Finally, Longworth's parents were not
charged with any crime and therefore did not require representation.63 On these
facts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the PCR court's finding of no conflict
was not an unreasonable determination of the facts.'
Longworth also contended that Powell's performance compromised his
representation.65 Longworth pointed to the testimony of Dr. Raskin, a forensic
psychiatrist, who stated in a deposition that his evaluation of Longworth did not
55. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 447.
56. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
57. Longwortb, 377 F.3d at 443 (alteration in original) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335,348 (1980)); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "filn all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to... have the [aissistance of [clounsel for his defence").
58. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 444. Longworth contended that the conflict of interest was
manifested by Powell's failure to disclose to co-counsel the mitigation evidence concerning his
family history, which would have adversely affected his parents but benefited Longworth. Id at 441.
He also pointed to Powell's duty to protect the parents' income for his own benefit. Id





64. Longwortb,377 F.3d at 444; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2000) (stating that if an adjudication
of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented" in state court, then an application for a writ of habeas corpus
shall be granted; part of AEDPA).
65. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 444.
[Vol. 17:1
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include information about the domestic problems in Longworth's family
history.66 The Fourth Circuit, however, relied on evidence that it was Johnston
who took responsibility for the information given to or withheld from Dr.
Raskin. 67 Finally, even if Longworth had shown an actual conflict of interest, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the PCR court's determination that any conflict
did not prejudice Longworth's representation was not an unreasonable
determination of the facts."
B. Introduction of False or Misleading Testimony
Longworth asserted that Murray's trial testimony was knowingly false.69
Both the trial court and district court concluded, however, that Murray's
statement was merely an interpretation of Longworth's words, consistent with
Murray's own testimony that his trial statement was "not verbatim" and "not a
quote per se."7 Further, during his PCR court testimony, Murray repeatedly
insisted that his response at trial was in fact a true statement of what he thought
Longworth meant.7 On these facts, the Fourth Circuit credited the court's
determination and held that the decision was not an unreasonable determination
of the facts.7 - The court found reasonable the Supreme Court of South
Carolina's conclusion that the trial court's "forceful curative instruction" was
sufficient to negate any prejudicial effect of Murray's statement.
73
C. Brady Claim
Longworth argued that Murray's statement regarding his mental impression
of Longworth's remorse was Brady material and should have been provided to
the defense for use at trial.74 The Fourth Circuit distinguished Longworth's claim
66. Id at 442, 444.
67. Id. at 444.
68. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to a state
court decision shall not be granted unless the state court decision was "based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding"; part of
AEDPA).
69. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 444.
70. Id. at 446.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (stating that if an adjudication of the claim resulted in a
decision based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented"
in state court, then an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be granted; part of AEDPA).
73. I-ongworth, 377 F.3d at 446-47.
74. Id. at 447; see Brad, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding "that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment").
20041
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from the claim in Strickler v. Greene,75 on which Longworth relied for the
proposition that Brady applies to a witness's mental impressions. 76 The court
noted that the suppressed mental impressions in Sttickler were contained in
written documents. 77  In contrast, Murray's mental impressions were not
recorded and were only vague perceptions. 78 Further, Murray's actual statement
was disclosed to the defense.79 The Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no
"'clearly established federal law'" requiring the State to disclose Murray's mental
impressions as Brady material. 8'
D. Procedural Default
In addition to the conflict of interest claim, Longworth asserted five general
IAC claims. 8 The Fourth Circuit determined that those claims were procedurally
defaulted because Longworth failed to assert them in the certiorari petition to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina for review of the PCR court's decision.
8 2
Longworth argued that the IAC claim based on conflict of interest and the
general claim of ineffective assistance were effectively the same. 3 The Fourth
Circuit rejected his argument and held that because the general IAC claims and
underlying operative facts were not presented to the state supreme court, the
claims were procedurally barred.' 4
75. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
76. Longwortb, 377 F.3d at 447; see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289-90 (1999) (stating
that the question of whether the suppressed evidence would have more than likely produced a
different verdict is not material and that whether the defendant received a fair trial, meaning a trial
whose verdict is worthy of confidence, is the true test of materiality).
77. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 447.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
81. Id.
82. Id at 447-48. In Longworth's petition for a writ of certiorari, he contended that he was
deprived of effective assistance of counsel for numerous reasons including. "failure to disclose
Longworth's alleged cocaine use at the time of the murders. . . ; the failure to provide an expert
witness evidence of Longworth's cocaine use and his family history; the presentation of two
witnesses who offered some allegedly damaging testimony; and counsels' alleged incompetence and
inexperience." Id at 447; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (barring consideration of federal habeas claims if
the petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies; part of AEDPA).
83. Longwortb, 377 F.3d at 448.
84. Id
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IV. Application in Virginia
A. Conflict of Interest
The United States Supreme Court has addressed attorney conflict of interest
claims in a series of cases. In Cuyler, the Court addressed a conflict of interest
claim in the context of an attorney's representation of co-defendants." The
Court held that "[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant who raised no objection [to such multiple representation] at trial must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance." ' Notably, Cuyler also imposed a duty on trial courts to inquire
into conflicts of interest if the court "knows or reasonably should know" that a
potential conflict exists.87 At the same time, the Court held that absent such
knowledge or an objection from the defendant, multiple representation does not
per se entail a conflict.88 The Court in Cuy/er did not answer the question of
whether the standards announced would apply in all conflict of interest cases,
including personal conflict and successive representation conflict.
In Woody. Georgia,89 a case more on point with Longworth, the Supreme Court
addressed the inherent risks that arise whenever a lawyer is hired and paid by a
third party to represent a criminal defendant.9" In Wood, the defendants were
charged with distribution of obscene materials at their place of work and were
represented by a lawyer hired by their employer.9 1 The employer assured the
defendants that he would pay fines resulting from the charges but reneged when
fines were actually imposed.92 As a result, the court revoked the defendants'
probations and held the defendants in jail.9 The defendants then claimed the
court's ruling discriminated against them on the basis of poverty, in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause." When the case reached the United States Supreme
85. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-48.
86. Id. at 348. An actual conflict of interest occurs if the interests of the lawyer and the client
diverge during the representation in regards to "a material factual or legal issue or to a course of
action." Id at 356 n.3; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "jin all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defence'.
87. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347-48; see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978) (creating
an automatic reversal rule when counsel is required to represent co-defendants over his timely
objection, unless the trial court has conducted an inquiry and determined that there is no conflict).
88. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47. The Court emphasized defense counsel's own "ethical
obligation to avoid conflicting representation and to advise the court when a conflict arises during
the course of a trial." Id at 346.
89. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
90. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-74 (1981).
91. Id at 262, 266.
92. Id. at 264.




Court, the Court determined that the case had the appearance of a test case
engineered by the employer in its own interest.95 The Court noted that, "[i]f the
offenders [could not] be jailed for failure to pay fines that are beyond their own
means, then this [employer or ] operator of [the] 'adult' establishment[ ] [would]
escape" having to pay fines imposed on employees arrested for conducting its
business.96 The Supreme Court found a serious potential for injustice and
remanded for a determination of whether an actual conflict existed at trial."
Longworth highlights a particular conflict of interest problem that is perhaps
less obvious than the potential conflict in Wood. Retained counsel are typically
hired by family members, whose complete and unadulterated stories are often an
essential component of a defendant's own life history in mitigation. In Longworth,
whether or not Powell labored under an actual conflict of interest, his agreed-
upon $12,000 fee was dependent upon the stable income stream of Longworth's
parents.9" He had a pecuniary interest in protecting the Longworth family by not
disclosing the history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence.' 9 Further,
Longworth's mother specifically entreated Powell not to introduce the family's
troubled history."° Although Longworth's parents clearly had Longworth's
interests at heart, they strongly preferred an expurgated defense for their son.'0 '
At the same time, Longworth, on trial for his life, had an interest in and a right
to a fully developed and unvarnished defense. Thus, even absent a colorable
claim that defense counsel actual!y represents the parents, there is a substantial
risk that counsel's trial and mitigation decisions will be clouded by a concern for
alienating or angering the paying family members. Defense counsel should be
aware of and take seriously this potential for conflict.
B. The Right to State-Paid Costs and Services under Ake v. Oklahoma
Longwortb raises a question in regard to a defendant's right to state-paid costs
and services under Ake v. Oklahoma.'0 2 Specifically, should the fact that an
95. Id at 267.
96. Wood, 450 U.S. at 267.
97. Id at 273. The language in the holding of Wooddid not include the second adverse effect
prong of the test set forth in Cuyer. Id at 273-74. Later, in an attempt to clarify the standard, the
Supreme Court stated that the language in Wood was shorthand for the statement in Culer that" 'a
defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actualy affected the adequacy of his representation need not
demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.' " Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002)
(quoting Cuyler, 466 U.S. at 349-50) (emphasis in Mickens).
98. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 441. Longworth's mother testified that she informed Powell of
her fear that Longworth's father would lose his job if the details of their family life became public.
Id at 442.
99. Id at 441-42.
100. Id at 442.
101. Id
102. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985) (discussing the showing that would entitle
(Vol. 17:1
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indigent's parents paid the sum of $12,000 to a private lawyer have any bearing
on whether the indigent defendant is entitled to state-paid costs and services
under Ake? The Supreme Court in Ake noted "that when a State brings its
judicial power to bear on an indigent [criminal] defendant..., it must take steps
to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense."' 13
Due process is violated if, as a result of a defendant's poverty, he "is denied the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his [life]
is at stake."'" Although the Supreme Court has not held that a state must
provide for indigent defendants all of the assistance that wealthier counterparts
might purchase, it has affirmed that indigent defendants are entitled to " 'an
adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary
system.' ,10
In Longwortb, a deputy Public Defender independently prepared an amended
order that designated Powell as the attorney for Longworth's parents.0 6 His
motivation was to make Longworth eligible for public funds.0 7 However, given
Ake, the modest $12,000 from Longworth's parents to defend a capital case
should not have affected Longworth's eligibility for public aid unless the $12,000
was sufficient to assure that Longworth received adequate opportunity to fairly
present his defense. Any defense need that extended beyond the $12,000,
including expert and investigation services, should have been covered by the
state.
C. Unrecorded Interrogation
Longwortbillustrates the systemic problem of casual interrogation procedures
that result in unreliable and often prejudicial testimony at trial. Murray testified
at trial that Long-worth told police in an unrecorded postarrest interrogation that
he knew what was going to happen before Rocheville shot Alex Hopp.'
0 8
Although the prosecutor had already determined the statement was too unreliable
to offer into evidence, Murray nonetheless repeated the statement on the witness
stand." The trial judge denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial and gave
an emphatic curative instruction. " The instruction, however, did not alter the
a defendant to psychiatric assistance as a matter of federal constitutional law).
103. Id. at 76.
104. Id
105. Id at 77 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
106. Longwortb, 377 F.3d at 443.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 445.
109. Id at 446.
110. Id at 445-46.
2004]
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plain fact that crucial aspects of a capital defendant's unrecorded interrogation
were misrepresented."'
Without an accurate record of interrogation proceedings, the accused may
suffer infringements of his basic right against self incrimination, his right to have
counsel present, and ultimately, his right to a fair trial.n 2 However, despite calls
for routine taping of interrogations, only three states require electronic recording
of interrogations: Alaska, Minnesota, and Texas." 3  The Supreme Court of
Alaska, in 1985, concluded that recording routine stationhouse interrogations
would serve the public interest, the interests of law enforcement officers, and the
interests of the accused." 4 As recently as 2002 the Illinois Commission on
Capital Punishment recommended that "[clustodial interrogations of a suspect
in a homicide case occurring at a police facility should be videotaped."' 5 The
recommendation went further, stating that "[v]ideotaping should not include
merely the statement made by the suspect after interrogation, but the entire
interrogation process.""' 6 The Commission listed numerous benefits which flow
from the institution of videotaping of postarrest interrogations, including
increased safeguards for suspects and deterrence of coercive interrogation
methods likely to elicit untrustworthy confessions." 7 Seven months after Illinois
Governor George H. Ryan commuted the sentences of 171 death row inmates
to life, Governor Rod Blagojevich signed a bill that made Illinois the first state
to statutorily require the electronic recording of custodial interrogations."'
111. The lack of an electronic recording of Longworth's interrogation may also be partially
responsible for the Brady dispute.
112. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA.
L. REv. 1229, 1259-1270 (2002) (detailing the constitutional violations that can arise from unre-
corded interrogations).
113. Id. at 1263; see Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Alaska 1985) (applying the due
process guarantee of the Alaska Constitution and concluding that "when the interrogation occurs
in a place of detention and recording is feasible," an electronic record is "a reasonable and necessary
safeguard, essential to the adequate protection of the accused's right to counsel, his right against
selfincrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial"); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592
(Minn. 1994) (requiring that custodial interrogations "shall be electronically recorded where feasible
and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention"); see also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (stating that oral and sign language
statements by a defendant shall not be admissible against the accused unless an electronic recording
is made).
114. Sklansky, supra note 112, at 1265; Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1159-61.
115. THE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S




118. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3930/7.5 (West Supp. 2004) (granting appropriations for the
purpose of purchasing equipment for electronic recording); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT.705/10.3 (West
Supp. 2004) (providing for training of police officers on the methods of conducting electronic
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The logic applied by the Supreme Court of Alaska some twenty years ago
and by the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment in 2002 is compelling.
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has not considered the issue, at least
one Virginia circuit court judge called out for change following the Supreme
Court of Alaska ruling. In Copm ueath v Sink," 9 Judge Coulter noted that a
rule mandating recorded interrogations would enhance the reliability of police
work and eliminate battles at trial between an accused and an officer of the law
about what was actually said during questioning. 2 ' Accordingly, Judge Coulter
pronounced a "prospective ruling" that "all interrogation conducted in a
interview room where recording equipment is available, or can be made available,
should be faithfully recorded from beginning to end."12' The courts in Virginia
should follow the lead of Illinois, Alaska, and Judge Coulter and require the
videotaping of all stationhouse interrogations of suspects, and in particular,
capital suspects. Until such time, defendants will continue to face a needless risk
to their basic constitutional and trial rights.
D. Adoption Verbatim fPrcseaain's Pmpc&Mewrardxranrd Qrder
The Fourth Circuit observed in a footnote that, "[a]lthough we have
indicated that we 'do not applaud' a state court's practice of substantially
adopting the prosecution's proposed memorandum and order, the state court's
decision still merits the deferential review required by§ 2254(d)."' 22 The Fourth
Circuit has applied this same reasoning in no fewer than three cases since 1998.123
Although this record maybe consistent with a statement that the court does not
"applaud" the practice of state courts signing orders prepared in this way, the
regularity with which the court continues to afford such decisions § 2254
deference suggests the court does not disapprvw the practice of rubber-stamping.
Longworth made two relevant claims that the state court's decision should
not be subject to the deferential standards of § 2254(d). First, Longworth
asserted that the facts in the state court's order cannot meet § 2254(d)(2)'s
recordings of interrogations); 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.5 (West Supp. 2004) (stating that
the "oral, written, or sign language statements] of [an accused] minor... made as a result of a
custodial interrogation ... [are] presumed inadmissible as evidence ... unless an electronic
recording is made"); 725 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (West Supp. 2004) (stating that the "oral,
written, or sign language statements] of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation
[are] presumed inadmissible as evidence... unless an electronic recording is made").
119. 1988 WL 626028, at *1 (Va. Cr. Ct. Aug. 24, 1988).
120. Commonwealth v. Sink, No. CR88-367, 1988 WL 626028, at *15 (Va. Cr. Ct. Aug. 24,
1988).
121. Id
122. Lorgurh, 377 F.3d at 443 n.1.
123. Seegra1lyBell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229,233 (4th Cr. 2003); Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d




definition of an "unreasonable determination" because they were not in fact
determined by the court but rather by the Attorney General. 24 Second, and more
importantly, he argued that rubber-stamping the prosecution's proposed order
precluded an "adjudication on the merits" or a "decision" by the state court as
required by § 2254(d). 12 None of the facts in the PCR court's order, Longworth
contended, were actuallyfound independently by the state court. 126 Longworth's
habeas counsel iioted that "all of the facts 'found' by the PCR court [were]
contained in the Respondent's Proposed Order in the same language, in the same
chronological order, and using identical punctuation.' 127 The Fourth Circuit
rejected both arguments. 28
Fourth Circuit case law suggests that the level of diligence with which the
state court considers a proposed order before adopting it does not affect whether
a petitioner's claim was adjudicated on the merits. In Young v. Catoe 29 the Fourth
Circuit rejected an argument substantially the same as Longworth's 3 ° The court
held that the disposition of a petitioner's constitutional claims by adoption of the
state's proposed order "is unquestionably an adjudication by the state court."
13'
The court further stated that "fi]f that court addresses the merits of the
petitioner's claim, then 2254(d) must be applied."'5 2  Thus, a formal
pronouncement of judgment by the state court, as opposed to disposal of a claim
on procedural grounds, is sufficient, regardless of whether the state court
carefully reviewed the prosecution's order.'
33
In practice then, § 2254 deference is given to factual findings put forth
exclusively by the prosecution. Such deferential review is inherently prejudicial
124. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-4).
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Longworth, 377 F.3d at 443 n.l.
129. 205 F.3d 750 (4th Cir. 2000).
130. Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750, 755 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that if a state court adopts
one party's proposed order in a proceeding, then such an action is a decision on the merits and 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) must be applied upon habeas review by a federal court).
131. Id
132. Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (limiting a federal judge's ability to grant habeas relief
to instances in which the petitioner shows that a state court decision on the merits of the claim
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding"; part of AEDPA).
133. See also Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the defendant's
argument that a "perfunctory decision issued by the Virginia Supreme Court did not constitute an
'adjudicatlion] on the merits' "); Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151,156-57 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the Fourth Circuit will not "presume that a summary order is indicative of a cursory or
haphazard review of a petitioner's claims").
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to the defendant because the prosecution's version of the facts becomes the basis
for all future appeals by the defendant. As a result, the defendant may be
effectively deprived of meaningful appellate review. In addition, the possibility
exists that the prosecution may draft a proposed order after the State knows what
the ruling will be, encouraging over-reaching in fact finding by the prosecution
to the detriment of the defendant.
V. Conclusion
Longworthillustrates a common but little-noticed conflict-of-interest problem
faced by defense attorneys retained by families of capital defendants. Regardless
of whether the conflict amounts to a Sixth Amendment violation, retained
counsel must take care that underlying duties to third-party payers do not cloud
decisions made in representation of a client. Longworth also highlights the casual
nature with which the Fourth Circuit defers under 5 2254 to a state court
decision derived substantially or entirely on the prosecution's proposed
memorandum and order. Finally, Longworth demonstrates the need for safeguards
in the police interrogation process to insure that defendant and witness
statements are not misrepresented at trial.
Jessica M. Tanner
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